The relationship between nationalism, politics, and the development and practice of archaeolog?. has recently become a ~opular topic among archaeologiuts. Thiu paper review the relationuhip hetrveen nationalism, political developments, and the rise and progreus of archaeologv in Iran from the mid 19th century to the present. The Iranian reaction to foreign interference is inveutigated here, and the role Iran's past has played in reinforcing nationalist sentiments is explored. It is argued that whenever the political uituation provided a favorable environment, intellectuals and politicians, in various capacities, have exploited the archaeological and historical record, especially those of the Achaemenid and Sauanian empireu, to advocate their nationalist agendas. Thiu paper concludes with an assessment of the recent manifestations of Iranian nationalism in the postrevolutionary era, and its utilization of Iran's history and recent sociopolitical transformations.*
Nationalism-as a n ideology that vests political rights and acconlplishments in a nation as a wholein its different social, functional, temporal, a n d spatial manifestations has long been a fascinating topic for sociocultural anthropologists. Archaeologists, o n the other h a n d , have recently begun to devise new approaches to nationalism by exploring the relation between their profession and nationalism and the effects nationalist sentiments can leave o n the development a n d practice of archaeo l o C g in different parts of the globe. ' T h e Near East, owing to its rich archaeological and historical past a n d its contemporan sociocultural diversity, has been particularly interesting for exploring connections between nationalism, archaeology, a n d political manipulations of archaeological record to advocate nationalist agendas.? This paper explores the very same questions in the case of a largely ignored country Iran. The Revolution of 1979 a n d the ensuing Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 brought all archaeological fieldwork in Iran *I would like to thank Kathryn Rabayan, Joyce hlarcuu, 1Ienry Wright, and anonymous reviewersfor reading and commenting on earlier drafts of thiu paper. I would also like to thank Ada111 T. Smith for providing me with a copy of his unpublished paper. Aqal~vayu, errors of facts and intet-pretationu, by foreign expeditions to a halt. Of the European, Japanese, and North American archaeologists who rvere active i n Iran, the younger generation has sought fieldwork opportunities elsewhere, and the senior generation has tried to publish the results of their research before retirement o r death. A1-though this hiatus during the Iranian revolution fostered many symposia a n d nunlerous publications, which in all possibility would not have materialized if fieldwork h a d continuetl in Iran, o n e should not ignore the fact that very few new archaeologists have been trained in Iranian archaeolo~?, a n d courses on the archaeology of Iran have been d r o p p e d from many academic curricula. Consequently, Iran, once a major center for field research, has slipped into a n archaeological isolation.
This situation may be changing. Recent developments in relations between Iran and many M'estern countries, including the Unitecl States, promise a n improvement in cultural exchange, and archaeological research in Iran by foreign expeditions may soon resume. Therefore, time seems ripe for a review of the development of archaeolo~?, nationalism, a n d political developments in Iran during the past 100 years. Among rnany lessons to be learned from this survey, o n e may begin to see why Iran undel-went such drastic sociopolitical changes a n d chose to go through political a n d archaeological isolation for so long.
THE BASES OF N A T I O N A L I S M I N IRAN
Most Iranians evince nationalist sentiments. But nationalism expressed by members of different segments of Iranian society demonstrates qualitative and quantitative differences. These differences emanate from Iranians' degree of historical consciousness, as well as their exposure to national and international intellectual currents. A semideveloped historical remain solely my reuponsibilit);. I Cf. Trigger 1984; Kohl and Farvcett 1995; htkinson et al. consciousness characterizes Iranian society. For the general public this understanding is vague but incontrovertible and rarely exceeds mere description or speculation; it lacks either the vigor or the precision that characterizes acadernic debates.
T h e nationalism of educated Iranians, o n the other h a n d , is sophisticated a n d coherently articulated. A review of the relevant publications would show that educated Iranians are capable of producing thousands of pages o n the glory of ancient Iran a n d its contribution to world c i d ization. But, despite its academic aura, the nationalism advocated by educated Iranians may also fall into the same pitfalls that characterize the nationalism of the general public. This is largely because of the fact that nationalism, among many o t h e r concepts a n d disciplines-including archaeology-was imported to Iran in the 19th century by Ll'estern-educated Iranians o r the introduction of Ll'estern concepts into the Iranian society. As we will see in this paper, this lack of indigenous development has prevented b o t h nationalism a n d archaeology from a natural a n d gradual development in the context of Iranian culture-a problem that still troubles both. The nationalism advocated by educated Iranians seems to fall into two broad categories: historical and political, both of which have proven to be potentially enduring. In the past few decades a minor u n d e r c u r r e n t a m o n g Iranian intelligentsia has shown that Iranian historical nationalsim is capable of approaching chauvinism, perhaps even racism. There is n o dispute that in the past century, Iranian nationalism frequently has been used politically, but the political nationalism that intermittently resurfaced in this time period demonstrates a displaced emphasis o n Iranian nationalism. For political nationalists, ancient Iran is of little or n o concern, and they may only sporadically use Iran's past to advocate their goals, which primarily include freeing contemporan Iran from foreign influence a n d ensuring that Iran asserts itself in the world scene. Historical nationalism, o n the other hand, is characterized by an elaborate, and sometimes crude, attempt to glorif'y the histon and culture of ancient Iran. Unlike its political counterpart, historical nationalism is only tangentially associated with poli- iAhnanat 1997 , 7. hIeskoob 1992 ';\fshar 1927. 'X' aziri 1993.
'Cf. cle Morgan 1902 Morgan ,1903 hIovtafa~i 1935; Ma'soumi 1976 XBDI [AJJA 105 tics. Nonetheless, a glance at the recent histon. of Iran shows that historical nationalism is swift to adLrocate its agenda whenever politics provides a fertile environment.
No culture can survive o r evolve in isolation, thus coercive o r cordial interaction with foreign cultures through t h e ages has dramatically transformed Iranian culture. Arguing that Iranian culture today is the same as at the time of the Achaemenids o r Sasanians is obviously incorrect, but several persistent cult~~lral traits suggest that some degree of cultural continuity exists between contemporary and pre-Islamic Iran. The foundations of Iranian culture laid in pre-Islamic times proved to be resistant to sociopolitical change. Even before their resurrection in the Pahlavi period, preIslamic traditions were influential in Iran. Especially in the case of the institution of kingship, it has been argued that rulers of the Qajar dynasty modeled their kingship after the Sasanian monarchy which was transmitted to the Islamic period through general histories, instructions for kingship, a n d several versions of the Book of Kings, especially the Shah Lizrneh of Ferdowsi. ' Perhaps the most vital factor in this cultural continuity and the hallmark of Iranian national identity is the Persian language. Having been used in Iran at least since the time of Achaemenids in the sixth century B.C.E., the Persian language has assumed a distinctive Iranian character4 and become intertwined with Iranian national identity and unit y: j Not surprisingly, in recent times the Persian language has been one of the most important contexts in which Iranian nationalism has flourished. This paper is not an attempt to study the development of nationalism in Iran; others have studied this topic, whether in its support" o r denial.' My goal here is to explore the elusive connection between nationalism, politics, the development of Iranian archaeology, and the uses and abuses of archaeology and ancient histon in promoting nationalism in Iran in the past century and half. Following some pioneering works,hfter the Revolution of 1979, the histo]-) of archaeology in Iran has attracted considerable attention, both among foreign!' and Iranian scholars.'" Most of these studies, however, are either descriptive or are chronicles of " Cf. Youilg 1986; Pen-ot 1989, 199'7; Chevalier 1989 Chevalier , 1992 Chevalier , 1997 Gi-an-,-\!merit and Gran-.A>-me~ic 1991; Carter 1992; Curtis 1993; Larsen 1996; Gluck and Siver 1996; Dyvon 1997; cle 1997 . 'I' Cf. Malek Shahmirzadi 1986 ,1987 *kkaii 1988; hl. hIousa\i 1990 hl. hIousa\i ,1994 X. Mousa\i 1992 X. Mousa\i ,1996 Chegini 1994 T h e long reign of Naser ad-Din Shah (1846-1896) witnessed both the rise of modern nationalism and the beginning of archaeological research in Iran. In this period, Iranian interest in archaeological material rarely advanced beyond mere treasure hunting and antiquarianism, and the lack of any serious appreciation for the cultural ~~a l u e of archaeological sites or artifacts led to much destruction. The new hobby was particularly appealing to 1994a Negahban 1997; Iiarimlou 1999; Niknami 2000 . " Larsen 1996. l%wlinson 1885. The fifth monarchy~vas theA1chaemenids, the uixth the Parthianu, and the seventh the Sasanians. '"Etemad al-Saltaneh 1978, 407 . A distance south of Damghan there is a mound knolvn as Tappeh Hesar. X few months ago some antiques were discovered there. Since then [people] have been corking there and finding m a~~e l o~i s objects. The first time I was in Damghan, I visited the mound and realized that they are not working properly. I told them chat to do, and to bring water to the head of the mound to finish thejob faster and more efficiently. The second time I was there they were much better. . . . They have dug a stream ~chich ran through the mound and washed antiques unbroken.
Some excavations were in fact spoilsored by Nase r ad-Din Shah: "[Slome ruins can be seen in parts of Lar. His l'lajesty ordered some spots to be dug. Some nice tiles came out."'91eanwhile, in his narrative of the pilgrimage to Karbala and Najaf, Nase r ad-Din Shah wrote, "They did some tala-shuyi today. I didn't go. It was windy and dusty. I sent the Butler, hIirza Ali Khan-e LIohaqqeq; [he came back a n d said that] considerable gold, silver, a n d objects were discovered."'; Already, these destructive activities had raised considerable emotion anlong the educated elite of the Qajar period. In 1877, after a visit to a number of European countries, Hajj Sa~yah wrote, "I have not seen a country as miserable as Iran or a nation as unfortunate as Iranians. Other countries not only preserve every menial remain left behind by ancient commoners of their own c o u n t n with much effort, but spend a great deal to take antiquities of other lands to their country investigate its date and its makers with painstaking accuracy and, indeed, are proud of this."'" " 'Etemad al-Saltaneh 1978 , 732. "Schindler 1968 , 206. ""Etemad alSaltaneh 1978 , 92. "i\bbasi and Racli' 1993 hlon mari Ctait derneurC dans les termes les plus affecteux avec le docteur Tholo~an, mCdecin et ami de Nasr ed-Din chah. Pendant la durke de notre premier voyage nous avions d6 ses recommandations de penetrer dans les mosquCes les mieux closes; souvent mi.rne notre securiti avait dependu de ses soins. Ce fut a lui que nous emes recours.
Pendent que notre ministre engageait avec le gomrernement persan de nou~velles negotiations, le docteur Tholozan s'aressait directement au chah. I1 interessa la roi au succes de travaux qui devaient mettre en lumiere l'histoire glorieuse de ses antiques predecesseurs; il lui parla l'estime que prendraient ses contemporains pour le caractere d'un prince toujours heureux de favoriser les efforts du mondes savant. Si, en sa qualite d'autocrate, Nasr ed-Din chah ne tolere pas volontiers la contradiction et ne se laisse pas detourrier aisement d'une idee preconcue, comme homme il est accessible a des considerations d'un ordre Clevk, et l'on ne fdit pas un, vain appel ases sentiments gPnCreux.
Nous, en eumes hientat la preuve.
Le gouvernment persan presenta quelques observations relatives aus tribus pillardes de 1'Arabistan The Dieulafoys dug at Susa from 1884 to 1886. The artifacts they discovered and sent back to the Louvre Museum in Paris raised considerable excitement."' This reaction encouraged the French government to plan future work at Susa o n a larger scale. But, after the 1886 season, the Iranian government, because of the skirmishes that the French excavations had caused in the Susa area, refused to renew their permit. In fact, Naser ad-Din Shah was annoyed by Marcel Dieulafoy, who, ignoring the terms of the concession, took all the finds to France. The Iranian government officially protested to the French government. In response, in 1889 t h e French government invited Naser ad-Din Shah to visit the new Persian exhibition at the Louvre, Naser ad-Din Shah, ,joyful in finding a chance to travel to Europe, accepted the invitation, vielved the exhibit, and withdrew the p r o t e~t . '~ Subsequently, in 189.5, one year before his assassination, under the influence of Dr. Tholozan, Naser ad-Din Shah granted the French the right to conduct archaeological exca~ations in the whole country. Ttvo years later, the French government founded the Dblbgc~tion scientiflqueFrc~n~crisr en perse, with Jacques de Morgan as its director. De Morgan soon established himself at Susa, built a fort o n top of the Acropole mound, and embarked o n excavating the site, using methods that by today's standards were inaccurate, to say the least.'" In 1900, motivated by the large number of eye-catching discoveries at Susa, the French obtained the monopoly o n archaeological excavations in Iran from Mozaffar ad-Din Shah (1896 -1905 , the son and successor of Saser ad-Din Shah.'" Both concessions were completely in favor of the French. According to them, all the antiquities discovered in excavations were to be sent to France, and the Iranian government would only be r e i~n -bursed for objects made of gold and silver. This provoked a number of nationalists to protest against the looting of the cultural heritage of Iran. Haij Zein-alL'Abedin-e Maragheh-i, u n d e r the pseudonym of Ebrahim Beig, protested:" "I heard the agonizing news that recently the right to excavate at Shushtar and Hamadan and elsewhere has been '" Schindler 1968. 206-7. "' R.fostafa\i 1955, 348. "L,oftlls 1857; Curtis 1993. 'Wie1llafo)-1990, 22-3. "Cran-..\\maric and <; ran-..\7maric 1991,139-81: Chevalier granted through the French ambassador to a French company. The Iranian nation has not the faintest clue about these matters, but those who comprehend its abusive consequences are in great calamity that all those ancestral treasures our motherland has preserved for us Irallia~ls in her bosom for ages . . . is lost to a j'ufirran~~.'""
Devoid of ally ecollomic initiative, S a s e r adDin Shah distributed Iranian resources to eager foreigners to obtain easy revenues for his extravagant court a n d luxurious European trips.'" The lucrative tobacco concession granted to the British Major Gerald Talbot in 1890 was the last straw for middle-class Iranians, already frustrated with the incompetence of the Qajar kings. The tobacco affair triggered a chain reaction, leading in less than a year to the ~cithdra~cal of the concession, in six years to the assassillation of Saser adDin Shah, and in 16 years to the Constitutiollal Revolution of 1906.
T h e original instigators of the Revolution of 1906 were three groups from Iranian society: the clergy, the merchants, and the intellectuals, only the latter with strong nationalist feelings.'"' The clergy, without whom the revolution would not have succeeded, soon realized to their dismay that the new system would implicitly favor secularism. The merchant participants, o n the other hand, were satisfied when the revolution f~~lfilled their material demands. Lastly, the intellectuals, who had n o previous experience in the deceitful world of politics, became disillusioned and drifted away when the British a n d the Russians resumed their pressure o n Iran. T h e Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 is considered by many" to be a turning point in natiollalism in Iran. Accordillg to the terms of this agreement, Iran would be divided into British and Russian spheres of influence, with a neutral buffer zone in the middle. The Iranian government refused to recognize this agreement but had n o power to prevent it from happening. Iranians were greatly offended and objected strenously. Sationalist poets protested against the agreement with patriotic expressions recalling glories '"F~im7l~pderived a somewhat derogaton frorn Frank-is term in Iran in the past to refer to Europeans.
" 'Amanat 1997 . '"Despite their nationalist sentimeno, it is interesting to see that a grollp of the early nationalists regarded the long histo17 of Iran as a source of disgrace rather than pride. E.g., on the first anniversarv of the re\:olution, the influential ner\. Pirnia's History is a diligent piece of scholarship in which he consulted many sources in European languages as well as ancient and modem Sear Eastern texts. Furthermore, in order to provide an upto-date text, he corresponded with many scholars investigating ancient Iran, especially Ernst Herzfeld, with ~vhom Pirnia was in close contact throughout the lvriting of the Historj. Interestingly, despite Pirnia's strong patriotic feelings, the Histoq is exonerated from biased interpretations that characterize ~latio~lalist writings. This has made the Histojy one of the most valued and widely read works of historiography in nod ern Iran.
In 1928 an autonomv, removed foreign influence, and embarked o n extensive industrial and militan modernization and socioeconomic reform^.^" Reza Khan's strong patriotic feelings date to before the coup, and even back then he did not hesitate to openly express them. Patriotic expressions with frequent references to Iran's past were an integral part of Reza Khan's speech. C)n December 7 , 1921, he told a group of gendarme officers, "Gentlemen! Our dear homeland is in urgent need of its brave sons. It is u p to you to show l o f~ resolve in the service of the country. and to make efforts to secure the independence of your country. Be alert and diligent; the dust of Ardashir is watching over yo^.""
In a proclamation on the first anriiversa~? of the coup, Reza Khan addressed the critics: "If you reminisce a bit, you will realize that the land of Darius was o n the verge of destruction because of actions of his evil and illegitimate children. . . . I was unable to allow a group of intrigues to succeed in their efforts to strangle this three-thousand-year-old country merely so that they might make a profit. That is why I brought about the coup d'etat."" Reza Khan had two overriding and inseparable goals that h e pursued relentlessly: to restore Iran to some of its former greatness and to establish himself as the absolute power on top of the reconstructed nation." In his first speech after he was appointe d prime minister in 1923, Reza Khan stated:
There are t~o sorts of nl~yfortune either one of ~~h i c l i , if not iemedit=d, 1s able to destro~ the riat~orial ~derititb of arir deteriorating race or people These are dornest~c disorder arid Iriyecurlt\ arid chaos of thought, ideas and morals I n exanunatlon of the iecent elents In Iian -111 show that these two factory, fiom ~~111ch emanate all our troubles, ewsted thioughout the countr\ The first source of ad\ers~t\ hay, thanks to Prol~dencr, been ehni~nated hen 1s the tlrne to correct the 5ec-ond and n o l~ IS the occaylon to la\ a sound foundation for Iran~an nat~onaht! We are full\ alert to the fact that the morale of the publ~c has, in general, been lowered to a thieatening extent There are Inan\ ~h o .
heedlesy of the princl- the Sheikh of hlohammareh (now Khorramshahr) , was one of the local leaders who opposed the rising star of Reza Khan. After attempts to ally himself with the dying @jar dynasty and the opposition group to Reza Shah in the parliament, Sheikh Khaz'al sought the support of the Kritish, who were already excited about the prospects of the recent discovery of oil in Khuzestan. In an act of open rebellion against Tehran, Sheikh Khaz'al declared himself the protector of Islamic shnri'n against Iranian secularisni a n d the defender of the Arab people of JLhuzestan, who had n o ethnic or linguistic ties with the Iranians. Sheikh Khaz'al sought to persuade the nomadic chiefdoms of the Zagros to ally with him, thus transforming the Zagros Llountains into an impregnable barrier between Reza Khan and Khuzestan. Sheikh Khaz'al's attempts met with n o success, and in 1924 Reza Ktian personally led a militan campaign into Khuzestan. Sheikh W~az'al, abandoned by the British, was defeated in a rrlatter of houi-s.~' T'Vhile in Khuzestan, Reza Khan paid a visit to Susa arid, to his great despair, learned about crude archaeological activities at the site by the French and the Concessions of 189.5 a n d 1900.4" Shortly after~vards, encouraged by nationalist figures, especially General Faraj-Allah Aq-evli a n d entrusted14ith thejob: "'The guide took them [Reza Shah and his retinue] to alarge open pit and showed an area thathe said was the remains of' one of the audience halls of the Alchaemenid rulers, and added that a piece ofcement from the floor was in the Musezun in Tehran. 'rhe Shah asked if nothing else had been found and was told that columns and statuettes liad bern t~ncoverrd. Pressed further the guide added that thrsr pieces were all in the Louvre Musenm. The ruler remarl\ed: 'Those thieves took all those objects to the Louvre and lrft the cement for Iran.' He \\,as so outraged and furious that he refused to eat lunch with his suite, and \vent offto eat by lrimself in the hut of the grnctarnle guards" (LVilber 1975, 179 1925-1926 and 1928 .'" After the abolition of the French monopoly, other coun-"'Godard continued to work in the Archarological Senice for another 20 years or so. But, as his l o~l t i e s lay elsewhere, he failed to earn the resprct oftllr Iranians (Malrk Shahmirzadi 1990,410, n. 31) ancl soon rurrlors brgan circulating ahout his involvemrnt with antiquities dralers, most scandalous of which probahly the "Zixiyeh Affair" (Kevkhosra~i 11184). The most serious hlow to Goclarcl's reputation came when, in 1950, he p~~l~lishecl a dealer's collection allegedly exranted from Zi~iyeh (Godard 1950) Persepolis has always been a great attraction for foreign travelers, historians, and archaeol~gists,~' not to mention the many Iranians who visited the site after its destruction at the end of the Achaemenid period." As early as 1685, Engelbert Kaempfer pleaded for the protection and preservation of the monuments at Persepolis, which were being mutilated or removed by vandal^."^ As scholarly interest in Persepolis grew during the 18th and 19th centuries, the prospect of excavations at the site became seum for sale in an antiquities store. The authoritirs were alerted, and Godard~vas imiied to adinner, given arrledal, thanked, and put on a plane to Paris.
"'Hrrzfrld accorrlpaniecl Reza Shah and his entourage in Iris \isit to western ancl southrwestrrn Iran from 25 October to 20 h'ol-enlber 1928 and in the meantirrlr conducted a genrral sun.ey of thr area; see Herzfeld 1929. "'Sancisi-IVeerde1111~1rg and Drijvers 1991. "Shahbazi 1980 . Prrsepolis was so fascinating to the Iranians that the first nloclern warship of thr Iranian a 600-ton cniisrr armeduith four K-upp guns purchased from Gennany in 1883, \\.as named "Persrpolis" (Curzon 1892, 2:3114-6) .
'"M'iesehlifer 11191. Sami (1941 -19\59), and Akbar Tqjvidi (1968 -1976 ."
Reza Shah was a strong supporter of excavations at Persepolis. He visited the site four tirnes. During his first visit to Persepolis in 1922, prior to beginning of excavations there, he commented that "We should built a wall at-ound Persepolis, so we could prevent more damage from happening to the site. \Ye really have to do something about this site.""' After his second visit to Persepolis in 1928, upon his return to Tehran, Reza Shah reinarked to an assembly of officials:
Mistory tells us about the splendor of ancient Iran. In the magnificent ruins of Persepolis one can witness this splendor without historians' bias, the ruins speak for themsel\-es and tell you the glon of ancient Iranian monarchs. '4Abdi 19116, 170. ' "rnst Herzfeld 11859-1948) fig. 2) ."" Although Reza Shah enjoyed spontaneous patriotic feelings, it can be argued that it was a single event that exhorted his strong will to revive the glories of ancient Iran. O n 22 April 192.3, the American art historian Arthur Upham Pope delivered a talk on "The Art of Iran in the Past and the Future."(;? The talk was in English, but it was concurrently translated into Persian for a large audience, including Reza Ifian (then prime minister and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army), his cabinet, members of the klqjles, members of the Society for Xational Heritage, and the American legation to Tehran. Pope presented a survey of Iranian art from the Achaernenid to Sasanian and Islarnic times, and stressed the cultural, artistic, and spiritual contribution of Iran to world civilization. Pope emphasized that kings of Iran have always served as patrons of arts and crafts, and irnplied that a cultural and artistic revival in Iran required government endorsement and encouragement.
Pope's talk left a deep and lasting impression on Reza Khan. Obviously the principal point was in harmony with his own impression of Iran's past glories, but patronage of arts and culture was a new challenge that he found particularly appealing. Consequently, Reza Shah embarked on patronizing arts and crafts.
hr chose not to rrturn to Gerninm niter hiu work in Iran, but went to London in 1935 and then to the LT.S., !\.here hejoinrd the Institute for .Ad~xnced Studirs at Princeton.
'"Herzfrld 1928.
' 'Balcer 1991 . "'hl. Mousa~l 1990 , 12. ""Quoted in l\.la'sotuni 1976 . '"Quoted in Esl\andari-Khoyini 1956, 72-3. " Quoted in Breasted 1933 , 407. "' LVilher 1975 , 180. "'Popr 1971 ; also reprintrd in Glucl\ and Sirrr 1996, 113-110. Carpet-weaving was financially supported and other traditional crafts promoted. The government also sponsored restoration and conservation works on many historical monuments. The "Neo-Persian" art that had flourished in the Qajar period64 received state endorsement when the government ordered that official buildings be built according to traditional Iranian architectural models, rather than European styles. The central branch of the National Bank of Iran, the police headquarters, and the central post office in Tehran were built imitating Achaemenid models, while the archaeological museum was inspired by the Sasanian palace at Ctesiphon.
Among the foreign scholars who worked in Iran in the Pahlavi era, Arthur Upham Pope (1881 Pope ( -1969 Lerner 1980 , Oxford 1972 , Munich 1976 . There was also a semioE-65 Gluck and Siver 1996. cia1 congress in NewYork in 1940. Despite considerable ef66There were in total seven congresses: and studies in Iran, Pope and Ackerman developed a close friendship with the Pahlavi family, and it has been said that it was Pope who originally envisioned and suggested to Mohammad Reza Shah the idea of the celebration of the 2,500th anniversary of the foundation of the Persian empire (see below).67 Perhaps one of the most significant developments in Iranian archaeology during the reign of Reza Shah was the establishment in 1937 of the Department of Archaeology at Tehran University. The cornerstone of the University was laid by Reza Shah on 4 February 1934. Inspired by the recent discovery of gold and silver foundation plaques at Persepolis inscribed with cuneiform inscriptions of Darius I, Reza Shah placed a gold foundation plate in a marble box set in the cornerstone of the Univer~ity.~~ The first student to graduate in 1941 from the Department of Archaeology was Fereydoun cavations at Malyan, but is better known for his literary works. Among the early instructors at the Department of Archaeology were two scholars who played important roles in promoting Iranian nationalism: Mohammad-Sadeq Kia and Ebrahim Pourdavoud. Kia, the first professor of Middle Persian at Tehran University, later, with Zabih Behrooz and Mohammad Moqaddam, formed the Society of the Land of Iran and published the Iran Koudeh series, which marked the climax of Iranian chauvinism (see below). Pourdavoud, more moderate than Kia in nationalist sentiments, was the first professor of ancient Iranian culture and languages, and the first to publish a Persian translation and commentary of Avesta. Fars, the name of the pro\lnce has I~ecome erroneo u s l~ s\non\mous ~\~t h the countrl, hereas as the correct name, Iran-the land of the Anans-has been used by Iranians to refer to their homeland from pre-Islamic times. This change Tias instituted at a time ~i h e n the concept of an "Xnan race" was the subject of much debate and was being used in political propaganda to justify increasingly harsh persecutions in Europe, and there is little doubt that the Iranian government was unaware of these political currents. It has even been suggested that the impetus for the change of the name originated from the Iranian embassy in Berlin."
HISTORICAL NATIONALISM I N IRAN DURING T H E EARLY PAHLAVI PERIOD
The grand emphasis on nationalism and ancient Iran that characterized the reign of Reza Shah left a deeper impact o n Iranian historiography and the Persian language than the practice of archaeolog). From the mid 19th century, \Vestern-educated Iranians ancl adoption of European sciences and crafts introduced hundreds of foreign words from European languages, especially from French ancl English, into the Persian language. By the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, the language used by educated Iranians in the fields of science, politics, and the militan was so replete with alien terminology that the general public would have found it sonle~ihat incomprehensible. As early as 1868, a group of nationalist intellect~~als ~i i t h strong antiArab and anti-Islamic serltinlerlts led by Slirza Slalkum Khan proposed to rid Persian of Arabic words. according to him, had a Persian root and meant, respectively, "of grand position" a n d "of Magian soul."
Chauvinistic ideas of the sort advocated by the Iranvij group did not catch on, and only a handful of Iranian writers followed themx1 Yet their basic ideas, especially a rnild tendency toward the pure Persian, sumived as an undercurrent in Iranian scholarship"" including the practice of archaeology. The Allies' occupation of Iran revived the dormant xenophobia of Iranian nationalism, under Tvraps during the Reza Shah era. The British and .Americans evacuated the c o u n t n shortly after the conclusion of the ~var, but the Soviets supported puppet governments in Azerbaijan and Kurdestan in an atternpt to separate parts of Iran. The attempt Failed, and ~vith political pressure from the L1.S. o n the U.S.S.R., in 1946 the Iranian Army recaptured both provinces. In the period bet~veen the end of the Second IVorld IVar and the early 1960s, Iran ~vitnessed major socioecononlic changes and political oscillations, some of which had a direct connection ~v i t h nationalism. Slost importantly, the Anglo-Iranian oil concession, which was left untouched during the reign of Reza Shah, led to an upsurge of Iranian nationalism in the early 19.50s, othenrise known as the "hfosaddeq era."
The hfosaddeq era is characterized by many historians of contemporary Iran as the "Nationalist" bpoqtlr. But the nationalism prornoted in this era was political, thus qualitatively different from the historical nationalism such as that of the Irinvj group (above), ~vhich stressed the his to^?. and culture of ancient Iran. LVhen in the early 1950s a group of Iranians with blohammad Slossadeq as their leader adopted the title 1ZJ~llijun(Nationalists) and established a party called , , their principal objective Tvas to eliminate the control of the British over Iran's oil and the infl~rence of the so-called thousand families over Iranian afFairs." The political nationalism of the blosaddeq era, however, hoped to revive Iran's great past by diverting oil revenues fro111 the BI-itish pocket to Iran's. i\lthct~~gh Mosaddeq and llatiollalists in his party succeeded in nationalizing the oil industry and ejecting the British from Iranian soil once and for all, they failed to anticipate the upcoming crisis. As Mosaddeq drifted from his original path and the threat of the leftist Tudeh party beca~rle imminent, in 19.53 the nationalist government fell to a coup d'6tat sponsored by the C1. A and MI-6, with the .American architectural historian, Donald N.
IVilber began preparing propaganda material ill Persian directed against hlossadeq. It included cartoons, small \+-all posters, stiort articles. Given high priority, it poul-ed off'the [Centl-a1 Intelligence] Agency's press and \\-as rushed bv air t o Teh~an. where it \\-as stol-ed "blilher 1986. h e n 2000 "bC11ber and Golonlbek 1987 ""TC~lher 1986 for distribution at the proper moment. 111 preparing the plan of operation, we realized that [Xlohammad Reza] Shah ~vould not dismiss Slossadeq unless pressured to do so. Pressure was applied, and he did issue an imperial decree dismissing hfossadeq and allottier naming General 7,ahedi as PI-ime Minister. . . . Our principal agents handed out thousands of copies of Shah's decree. our propaganda material flooded Tehran, clandestine papers appeared, raids were mounted on Tudeh Party offices and presses. On X~~gust 19 [I9531 loyalist mobs were collected in southern Tehran and tvere led intc~ the modern quarters, \\.here the) swept along soldiers and officers. General Zahedi emerged from hidilig to climb into a tank and be taken to ttie radio station, tvhei-e he proclaimed the new government.
The 1953 coup ptlt an end to the political nationalism of the Mosaddeq el-a. In the decade that followed the coup, Mohamnlad Reza Shah emerged as the absolute ruler of the country, with little concern for either t h e constitution o r the blajles. Backed by rising oil prices and foreign investment, especially U.S. support, Muhammad Reza Shah fost e r e d a n i m p r o p e r \'\'esternization a n d poorly planned industrialization of the country, ~vhich he called the "Ll'hite R e v o l~~t i o n . "~' Factories mushroomed without sufficient econonlic or industrial infrastructure, imports skyrocketed at the expense of the local craft production, while land and social anlelioration in the early 1960s put the Shah into a collisioll course with the clergy, especially with Ayatollah Kl~onleini.
T h e 1960s a n d 1970s ~vitnessed such a major growth in archaeological activities that one scholar has been prompted to describe it as "the Explosive Phase" in Iranian archaeology" Many expeditions embarked o n fieldwork in Iran frorn European countries, the United States, Canada, and,Jap;in. In addition, the Archaeological Senice of Iran, now an established organization, contributed considerably to archaeological fieldwork in Iran. Furthermore, the Department of Archaeology of Tehran Lrniversity under Ezat 0.Negahban began to play a more profourld role in archaeological research in Iran, both by undertaking its own projects and training archaeologists to serve in the Archaeological Senice of Iran. Following Robert Adams' pioneering survey, Khuzestan became an i~rlportarlt focus of research, especially to anthropologically oriented archaeologists, who introduced the "New Archaeology" to Iranian archaeology."' Bp the mid to late 1970s, the new approach was widespread in Iranian archaeology, with focus gradually shifting from single-site excavatiorls to regional sul-\eys, and more attention paid to other archaeological material besides architectural renlains and obj~ts rli~rl. The archaeological research by academically trained archaeologists from Iran and abroad in the 1960s and 1970s had the professional discipline to free itself from nationalist biases. Indeed, very little in the archaeological literature of this period seems to convey particularly nationalist connotations.'"' There was, however, another current in Iranian politics and among the intelligentsia that continued to promote such sentiments. This current was heir to the patriotism of the Reza Shah era, and follo~ving the same agenda, was ti?-ing to foster an ideoloa of nationalism by evoking the glories of pre-Islanlic Iran, especially the Achaemenid and Sasanian periods. Partially as a result of this, excavations were resumed at Persepolis and Pasargadae, two major Achaernenid capitals, and Bishapur, the capital of Sasanian emperor Shapur I, while extensive consel~ation and reconstruction were undertaken at Persepolis. S o t surprisingly, the impact of this current tvas more effectively felt in Iranian politics.
Iranian kingship of the Islamic period was traditionally associated with the Islamic sh/rri'/r, with the king as the defender and protector of Islam. But '"'There rvere only a handf~ll of Iranian archaeologists in these years rvho expressed nationalist sentirnentq in their rvritings, among them iUi Sami and .-\li-.Utl,ar Sarfarar. iUi Sami (1 910-1989) \\-as family. 11e !Kxs seivborn to aleartled Shira~i ingar a teacher in his home torsn.ivhen he met Eric11 Schmidt in 1936 arid becarne involved in rvork at Persepolis. X t e r Schmidt's departure, he ser-ved as an assistant for Iiosein Ravanbotl, and in 1941 replaced hi111 as the director of the Persepolis excavations, to be continued until 1949 and fi-om 1'352 to 1961. In the inter-val (1949-1931 ) , Sami excavated at Pasargatlae, the capital of C:yrus I1 (the Great). Sarni authored rnore than . 5O books and articles on various aspects ofancient Iranian ci\ilirarion (see.-\. Ilousavi 1990). including TfzrAtfznrtr~~7iid Cirlzlizntio~l in three vol~utles (Sami 1962-19691 and TIZP Snsnttint? (.'i71ili; otion in hso volumes (Sarni 1963-196.5) . Both boob are a tour d e force ofavailable knorvledge on these hc,o periods of Iranian histoi-\.. In his introduction to the first volume of 7'hu . Ichn~~rirnir/ Ci?~ili; cc/io,z, Sami (1962, 3-4) elaborated on his motivation for ~~nclertaking such a project: "'The ancient people of this land [Iran] enjoyed a prosperous culture and art. X t h o l~g h hi,to~ical events and the passage of time have after confrontations with religious bodies, especially i-\)atollah Khorneini in the early 1960s, llohammad Reza Shah increasingly distanced hirnself from religious institutions. As their influence, especially the clergy, was curbed by the State in the 1960s and 197Os, Mohammad Reza Shah sought othet. means to legitimize his sovereignty. It has been argued that invoking pre-Islamic values by Mohammad Reza Shah Itas a means to achieve this.!" Indeed, stress on nationalisrn and pre-Islamic values and traditions had proven to be an important asset in the time of his father, Reza Shah. Therefore, Mohammad Reza Shah made a great effort to present himself as the latest in a long line of great Iranian kings extending back to his favorite ruler, Cyrus I1 (the Great). Like his f~t h e r , who chose Pahlavi as his family name to ernphasi~e his links with pre-Islamic Iran, llohammad Rela Shah added another historical title, iItycirnrhr (the light of the Aryans), to his many titles.
The state-sponsored attempt to marginalire Islam in favor of the supposed pre-Islamic values and traditions provoked criticism from both the clergy and the liberal Islamie thinkers. hlorteza Motahhari, an established Islanlic theoretician, priblished a book emphasizing the dynamic historical interaction between Islam and Iran,"' while Ali Shari'ati, one of the early advocates of Islamic political and social ideology, gave talks at Hoseini-ye Ershad in Tehran urging Iranians to abandon IVestern and pre-Islamic traditions and return to heir true Shiite self: "The experts may know a great deal about the Sasanians, the Achaemenids, and even the earlier civilizatiorls, but our people know nothing about stich things. Our people do not find their roots in these civilizations. This effol-t rvas not a rrstllt of an>tl~ing but a love of mothel: land and praise of the raluable re~nains of the ancestors." X i .2khar Sarfarr. was the one who resumed escavations at the Sasanian city ofBishapur. In the introduction to his excavtion reportar a ~nonr~mzntal ofthe.4chaemenid date, stl~icture presumably ft-om the time of C:\TI~S 11, near Borazjan, SatSara7 (1971. 19) , wrote: "It ir with great pleasure that rrith the auspicious celebration of the 2,.i00th annivei-san of the fbundation of the Iranian Empire and the year of'Cyr~s the Great, the founder of the glorious rvorld empire, tlie Iranian archaeological expedition disco! ered They are left unmoved by the heroes, geniuses, myths, and monuments of these ancient empires. Our people remember nothing from this distant past and do not care to learn about pre-Islamic civilizations. Consequently, for us to return to our roots means not a rediscovery of pre-Islamic Iran, but a return to our Islamic, especially Shiite, roots."g3
None of these criticisms, however, deterred Mohammad Reza Shah from his grandiose plans to revive Iran's pre-Islamic glories, with himself at the zenith of the imperial Iran. Following this path, in 1967 Mohammad Reza Shah received an official coronation, and four years later masterminded a ceremony described by one observer as "The Show of or perhaps, one of the biggest abuses of archaeology and ancient history by modern politics. In October 1971, Mohammad Reza Shah held an ostentatious ceremony at Persepolis to celebrate the 2,500th anniversary of the foundation of the Persian empire by Cyrus the Great (fig. 4) .95 Heads of all governments were invited to the ceremony, presumably to reenact the scene on the Apadana stairway showing emissaries from nations subject to the Achaemenid empire bringing tribute to the Persian king. Many fell into the trap: one emperor, nine kings, three ruling princes, two crown princes, 13 presidents, 10 sheiks, and two sultans showed up, while some more observant heads of states cleverly excused themselves and sent their vice presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers, or amba~sadors.~~ The 93Quoted in Abrahamian 1982,470. 94 Time, October 25, 1971 , 32-3. 95The year 1350 A.H. (1970 was already labeled as "the year of the Cyrus the Great." The celebration also marked the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the Pahlavi dynasty, the 30th anniversary of Mohammad Reza Shah's reign, and the 10th anniversary of the 'White Revolution." %Like every other head of state, President Georges Pompidou of France was also invited, but he refused to come. Shawcross (1988,39) writes that Pompidou did not come because MohammadReza Shah refused to let himsit above Haile Selassie, the Emperor ofEthiopia, andFrancophone heads of states. Mozaffar Firouz, one of the Iranian dissidents in Paris, claims that he advised Georges Pompidou against attending this ceremony (Dolatchah -Firouz 1990,479-80) . In any event, Pompidou's refusal to attend the ceremony offended the Shah and souredFranc~Iranian relations. guests lvere housed in an encampment of tents designed and made by the French decorator ,ransen. The rest of the parapheralia also came from Paris, and the Maxim restaurant was entrusted lvith catering the food and beverages, all coming from Paris except for the caviar. The day after the banquet and the firelvorks display the guests sat down on the Persepolis platform and watched as the Iranian Army units-forbidden to shave for the past few months so that their beards could be trimmed to resemble those of ancient warriors-paraded in front of them dressed as the armies of Iranian dynasties from the Xchaeinenids to the Pahlavis. The official biographer of the Queen Farah later described the scene:"'
The tight crippled beards of the hledes anti the Persians; the srnall pointed I~eards of the Safavitis, or the fierce moustaches of Qajar troops. Shields, lances, pennons, hroads~vords and daggers of earlier warrior's, all Teere there. Beneath a scorching sun, but shieltied by parasols for those in neeti, the guests, ~vho Ivere seated on a rostrum belo~v the pillared ruins of C:yrus' [sic] the cerernony for its excessive costs, while others, including the Queen, lvere unhappy that it was so much French and so little Iranian. For some historical nationalists the ceremony was a fictional recreation of Iranian histon and a naive attempt by Mohainmad Reza Shah to elevate himself to the level of the great kings of ancient Iran by placing his brief dynasty o n a par lvith the Aclnaemenids and Sasanians. Others described it as self-aggrandizement by a megalomaniac and a cause for international hun~iliation and ernbarrassmcnt for Iranians in general."'" But perhaps the most fierce criticism came froin Ayatollah Khorneini in exile in Iraq. In a declaration issued on 31 October 1951, he wrote: "Are inillions of tunzclns [Iranian clirrency] of the people's wealth to be spent o n these frivolous and absurd celebrations? Are the people of Iran to have a festival for those whose behavior has been a scandal throughout his tor^ and ~v h o are a cause of crime and oppression, of abomination and corruption, in the present age?"""
The Persepolis ceremony proved to be more of a liability than an asset for the Pahlavi govern~nent. It failed to bring 1Ioharnmad Reza Shah either the international prestige o r national respect that he expected. Less than eight years after the ceremony and two years after the extravagant celebration of the 30th anniversary of the Pahlavi dynasty the Revolution of 1979 toppled the monarchy in Iran. DUI--ing the revolution, the Persepolis ceremony lvas frequently recalled as an example of intolerable Pahlavi excess. Footage from the cerernony Tras occasionally played on national television in the first few years after the revolution to remind the people of the despotism they had overthrown. There is n o need to discuss here the causes or outcomes of the Revolution of 19711, but it should be stressed that n o event in the recent histon of Iran transforined the political structure of the country as deeply as the revolution. Beginning from 7 .January 1978, lvhen the revolution was triggered by the publication of an article insulting Ayatollah Khorneini in a daily newspaper, Iran was gradually engulfed in an extensive series of demonstrations, strikes, and riots. h>ioharnmad Reza Shah's departure and Ayatollah Khorneini's subsequent return to Iran in January to Februan of 1979 accelerated ""I Gf. F~rouz 1971. "" Quoted in Xlgar 1981. 202. the revolution. O n 11 F e b r u a~v 1979, after a few days of street fighting bet~reen the revolutioi~aries and the last military troops loyal to the Shah, the Pahlavi government collapsed.
The elimination of the monarchy Isas frequently stressed as the revolution's primary goal. ,4s early as 1971, in the famous declaration, "The Incompatibility of Monarchy with Islarn," against the celebration of the "500th anniversary of the foundation of the Persian empire, Ayxtollah Kliorneini stated:
God only kno~vs \\.hat cliaasters the Iranian monarchy haa given rise [to] since its beginning and \\-hat crimes it has committed. The crimes of [the] kings of Iran ha\e blackened the pages of hiatol-y. It is the kings of Iran that ha\e constantly ordered massacres of their olvn people and had pyramids built with their skulls. . . . Tradition relates that the Prophet (upon wllo~n he peace) said that the title King of Kings, which is born b>-the monarchs of Iran, is the most hated of all titles in the sight of God. Iala~n ia fundamentally oppoaed to the \\-hole notion of monarchy. An)-one xvho studies the manner in which the Prophet eatahlished the ao\ernrnent of Islam will realize that Islam came in order to destroy these palaces of t)-ranny. hlonarchy ia one of the most shameful and disgraceful reactionan manifestations.""
The impact of the new regime's anti-monarchical stance on Iranian societv ~r a s profound. In the first few years after the revolution, anything associated with monarchy was despised, the noun 'shah' \\-as rernoved from many words o r replaced with nouns such as Islcrtn o r Itntrm (e.g., Shahabad was changed to Islamabad, and Bandar-e Shah was renamed Bandar-e I m a m ) . T h e government even made an attempt to abolish the No~rruz festival or shorten the new year holidays, but gave up after serious objections by the general public. Textbooks, especially those o n the history of Iran, were rewritten,""' emphasizing the Islamic period a n d religious figures and movements, marginalizing preIslarnic times as the age of ignorance, and chastizing Iranian kings as oppressive despots. Pre-Islamic monuments were recalled not as sources of national pride, but as symbols of monarchical tyranny imposed on the masses.
I11 harmony with this antagonism toward Iran's past, nationalism was widely rejected as an askew Ifistern concept promoted by colonialist powers and "Ll'estoxicated" (glzcl,6zadr,h) intellectuals. The term wle/lat (nation) gave way to owltnclt (the LIuslim ' ""uoted in Xlgar 1'381, 202. '"'Rlehran 1989.
'"-'Akhavi 1980, 175-6. '"'According to rurnors, during the street fights in Februal~ of 19'79, the Golestan Palace was broken into and a few items, including a m\-ord of Nader Shah, Lvere taken. hcurator of the community), and Iranian nationalism was rejected in favor of pan-Islamic agendas, emphasizing brotherhood arnong Muslims of the world. As soon as the Islamic government was stabilized, nationalists \sere suppressed along with the leftists and royalists. '4f-ter a short period of rernernbrance with admiration, h,iohammad Mosaddeq, the symbol of Iranian political nationalism, was discredited and his opponent, Ayatollah Kashani, was e~ilogized.'"~ -Fortunately, antagonism toward Iran's past never rnaterialized into action. Although Inany government buildings, banks, liquor stores, and a number of foreign embassies \\-ere attacked by the revolutionaries throughout 1978, there is no tangible evidence that any museums or archaeological or historical sites were vandalized.'"' The rumors of' an attempt to bulldoze Persepolis by a mob led by one of the early revolutionary figures in the first few weeks after the revolution was never officially coilfirmed or denied; ho~revel; the darnage had been done. The character of archaeology in Iran had suffered enormously from the self-seming demonstrations by the Pahlavi government. Consequently, the new i d e o l o g interpreted archaeolog as 110th-ing more than a pseudoscience in service of the court to glorify despotism and justify royal oppression of the masses, both inherently against the new belief system. Accordingly, archaeology fell into disfavor. The Department of X~chaeolo~gy of Tehran University, the only academic institution teaching archaeology in Iran at the time, was temporarily closed d u r i n g the Cultural Revolution (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) , with an attempt to abolish or incorporate it into the History Department only dropped after ol~jections by professors of archaeolog). The Institute of Archae~lo~gy of Tehran University survived only norninall!; not to resume its activities until 1990. In a general sweep, most foreign archaeologists were indicted as agents and forbidden from working in Iran, ~vhile some Iranian archaeologists were forced to retire or leave the country. Although the Archaeological S e l~i c e and the Office for Protection and Presen-ation of Historical Remains both remained fiuictional, for the first few years after the revolution, archaeological activities d~rindled to only a few operations per year, mostly of urgent or salmge nature. Problem-oriented research ceased, and archaeolog) became a mere bureaucratic activity.'"" for the~r help It \\as announced~mrnediateh on the radio that t h~r rhould not haxe happened and there objects belong to people U1 the qtolen objeco rjere returned the next da\ '""or a surnrnan of archaeolog~cnl actnltles beh\een lC)79 and lC184. see the -\rchaeolog~cal Semce ofIran 1989, Depu6 fol Plotect~o~l and Presenat~on 1984 palace went immediatel! to the revol~~tiona~~officialsandasked ter for teaching archaeology in Iran, there are nolv archaeology departments in several other Irania n universities, including Tarbiyat-e h,iodarres University (1f.X. a n d P11.D. degrees), Free Universities at Abhar a n d I<azerun (R.X.), a n d Tehran (M.X.), a n d Zahedan University a n d Bu-Xli University i n Harnedail (R.X.). T h e ICHO has also its olvn training center, with R.A. degrees in several field i n c l u d i n g archaeology, m u s e u m studies, a n d ethnography.
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The hostility toward histon and nationalism that characteri~ed the Revolution of 1979 was inherently inco~npatible ~vith the Iranian culture. ,4s revolutionary enthusiasm diminished, nationalism a n d concern for history returned. As early as .January 1981, only two years after the revolution, some scholars called for a rapprochement with history."' Since the mid 1980s, with the fornlation of se\.eral institutions-both private and government-sponsoreddevoted to the study of histor!; and the opening of many private and public archives, historical studies were rekindled and received enthusiastic response from both publishers and the general public." ' But a review of the historical literature published in Iran in the past few years'!4 sho~rs that pre-Islamic Iran has benefited very little frorn the recent enthnsiasm, and the majority of historical studies is concerned with Iran in recent centuries.
The new Islamic regime also slowly mellowed in its antagonism toward pre-Islamic Iran. Officials gradlially began to participate in national ceremonies, spoke in support of protection of national heritage, and paid visits to historical sites and museums. Reconciliation with Persepolis, ho~rever, came at last, when o n 20 ,4pril 1991 President AliAkbar Hashemi Rafsanjani paid a visit to Persepolis and wrote in the guest book:
In the narne of Xllah, the nlerciful, the compaasionate L'isiting the incredible remains at Persepolis provokes considerable national pride in even-individual. B>-seeing these remains, our people will discover their own capabilities and the cultural backgl-ound of their country, and \vill believe that they will recover their historical role in the future to upliold upon this talent and foundation, the blazing torch of Islarrl to light the path of other nations."' For the revival of nationalism, the Iraqi invasion in September of 1980 perhaps provided a crucial irnpetus. Patriotism was a potentially polverf~il contribution frorn the nonreligious segments of the Iranian society to the war effort against Iraq,"" a contribution that the Islamic government reluctantly, but silently accepted. Not surprisingly, the nationalism that emerged in Iran during the war \\-it11 Iraq demonstrates some of the features that characterized Iranian nationalism in earlier periods. Xenophobia a n d anguish over foreign invasions of Iran are among the most noteworthy aspects of contemporary Iranian nationalism. 12'ith the passage of time, as the Revolution of 1979 is slowly becoming an event in Iran's history, and especially since the election of President .Ifohammad Khatami in May 1997 and the ensuing social reforms, the early rrvolutioi~ar) idralism is giving Ivay to other concerns, including nationalism and Irailian identity."'
The historical nationalism that was dormant for a f e~r years after the revolution is flot~rishing again. Among the issues targeted by the contemporary Iranian historical nationalism are, not surprisingly, the two m+jor events in Iranian histo?: the GreekIllacedonian invasion a n d the fall of the Xchaemenid empire in 330 B.C.E., and the Xrab inmsion and the fall of the Sassanian empire in 651 C.E. I'Vhile under the Islamic Republic, implicit criticis111 of' the Xrab invasion and Iranian conversion to Islam may prove to be hazardous; at least one reputable scholar has tried to present an alternative reconstr~iction."~ X1-The other argulnent-rejecting exander's campaign in Iran-as an actual historical event,"" ho~vever, seeks its roots in the historical nationalism of the 1950s and 1960s, and largely emanates from hardcore nationalist feelings rather than professional historiography.
Last, but not least, in the past few years the debate over the name of the Persian Gulf has become contentious among Iranians intellectuals, including archaeologists.'"' Needless to say, increasing attempts to distort the name of the Persian Gulf has greatly offended Iranians. 12'hat Iranians find particularly disturbing is that these attempts a r e incited by the Xr-abs and supported by a number of \Vestern scholars working in Arab countries. In a recent paper, 1fajid7adeh traced the archaeologi-cal connection of the attempts to change the name of the Persian Gulf and criticized foreign archaeologists who s~vitched frorn Persian Gnlf to one of the illegitimate names after their fieldwork in Iran was disrupted after the Revolution of 1979."' Nationalism and archaeolog Fvere both imported into Iran in the 19th century by 1l.tstern-educated Iranians or the introduction of Mtstern concepts and disciplines into the Iranian society. Not surprisingl>., for average Iranians, to ~vhorn the past was a living pr~~jection of the present, both a r c l~a e o l o~q and nationalism were difficult to comprehend. The past and its physical rernains were scarcely considered a subject ~vorthy of scholarly investigation, only as objects of antiquarian curiosity or monetar-) greed.
Nationalism, o n the other hand, was a direct reaction to external interference that characterizes past and recent Iranian history It was only natural that with these premises, both archaeology and nationalism would face obstacles as they developed. Sationalism led to political manipulation and naive chauvinism, ~r h i l e archaeology rent t l~r o l i g l~ several stages of metamorphosis to emerge as an established scientific inquiry. In the meantime, the development of nationalism and the study of ancient histoiy in Iran are marked by symptom of an old chronic despondency, that is, seeking external scapegoats fbr internal perplexities that occasionally p u t Iranian culture into critical situations."Starting frorn pre-Islamic times, the Greeks or the Arabs were blamed for destroying the Achaernenid and Sasanian empires, ignoring the internal problems these t~vo imperial systems faced. 111 times closer to ours, the British, the Russians, and the Americans were resented for their interference in Iranian aff'airs and blamed them for many domestic problems.
.\lthough the old habit is still alive in some quarters, a neIv trend in Iranian scholar-ship is beginning to look inward, to seek internal pr-oblenis that have led to the decline of Iran in the recent past. Owing to its pivotal place in Iranian cultur-e, students of the Persian language are the first to ask the relevant questions. The shortcomings of Persian in coping ~vith an avalanche of new concepts and terms that marks our era is no longer described as a conspiracy to corrupt the symbol of Iranian national identi?, but is diagnosed as Persian speakers' preoccupation wit11 h~un1anities rather than sciences, which require development of specialized terminology and prose.'"+ In the field of historiography, the old conspiracy theories are slo~vly giving way to more realistic studies based o n internal elernents of Iranian 11isto1y.l~' In this transitional period in Iranian scholarship, archaeology and the study of ancient histon have proven to be more resistant to this new critical perspective. One should bear in mind that archaeolocgy and the study of ancient histon suffered the most from the Revolution of 1979. Thus it is understandable that they might be the last to emerge from the post-revolutiona17; coma, and, despite considerable quantitative increase, both are still among the fields with the fewest practitioners. In the fnture, the revolution that is occurring in the humanities in Iran at the moment may extend to archaeology and the study of ancient 11211, and subsequently to the character of Iranian nationalism. 
